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The contested instruments of a new governance regime: accounting for nature and 
building markets for biodiversity offsets 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – this paper analyses the processes involved in the creation and eventual demise of 
a market for biodiversity offsets in the UK. The reasons for the failure of this market to take 
hold as a governance mechanism are considered, and its subsequent effects examined. 
Design/methodology/approach – the research examines a single case study of the creation 
of a pilot market for biodiversity offsets in the UK. Data includes policy and industry papers, 
complemented with interviews with biodiversity offset practitioners, regulators and non-
government organisations. 
Findings – the case study demonstrates that a market for biodiversity offsets was piloted with 
the intent to contribute to the reform of the UK planning regime. However, disagreements 
about this political project, uncertainties in the knowledge base, and continued entanglements 
with existing biodiversity meant it was impossible stabilise the assemblages necessary to 
support the market, leading to its eventual demise. However, the principles and devices of 
offsetting have proved more resilient, and have started to combine with the existing 
arrangements for the governance of nature. 
Practical implications – the paper presents a situation where a political project to reform 
governance arrangements through the creation of a market was not successful, making it of 
interest to researchers and policymakers alike.   
Originality/value – while biodiversity offsetting has been widely discussed from scientific, 
legal and political perspectives, this article addresses it as a market, explicitly designed to 
become a part of a governance regime. It also advances the understanding of the mechanisms 
by which similar processes of marketisation can fail, and suggests avenues for future research 
in those contexts. 
 
Keywords Biodiversity offsetting, Accounting for Biodiversity, Social Studies of Marketisation, 
Governance, Ecological accounting 
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Introduction 
Biodiversity loss has been recognised as one of the most serious aspects of the ongoing 
environmental crisis in both academic and policy literature (MEA, 2005; Pimm et al., 2014; 
Seto et al., 2012; TEEB, 2008, 2010; Yule et al., 2013). Scientists, policy-makers, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), businesses and civil society groups have repeatedly 
raised concerns about the rate at which biodiversity is being lost. The scale of the problem is 
extremely serious: For example, the November 2015 update of the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature’s Red List of Threatened Species indicated 23,250 species threatened 
with extinction, out of a total of 79,837 species assessed (IUCN, 2015). In this context, there 
is growing interest in policies which aim to reduce biodiversity loss, especially around 
governance initiatives. Commenting on this issue, Liverman (2004) identified three main 
questions for the future of environmental governance regimes: who governs; at what scale; 
and at what price. Agents, spaces and values are thus three important dimensions in the 
evolving governance of biodiversity. This paper argues that equally important to the discussion 
are the assemblages in which agents, spaces and value come together to govern biodiversity: 
The mechanisms by which agents calculate the value of biodiversity at a given scale. In 
particular, the paper explores how accounting for biodiversity can be employed as a 
mechanism for creating market-like biodiversity governance mechanisms, but also the 
tensions and contradictions it suffers. 
If accounting can contribute by measuring the value of biodiversity, it consists only of one step 
towards achieving reductions in biodiversity loss. In addition to estimating the value of 
biodiversity, there need to be mechanisms by which that value can be captured, thus assuring 
that businesses and individuals have the appropriate incentives to protect nature (TEEB, 
2008). Among the mechanisms by which the ‘emancipatory potential’ of ecosystems 
accounting can be realised is biodiversity offsetting (ten Kate et al., 2004; ten Kate and Inbar, 
2008; Treweek et al., 2009). Biodiversity offsets consist of ‘...conservation actions intended to 
compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development 
projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity’ (ten Kate et al., 2004: 13). In a biodiversity 
offsetting situation, a company seeking to develop an area must compensate for the 
biodiversity losses it causes by paying a third party to supply and protect equivalent 
biodiversity elsewhere. Offsetting involves the measurement and valuation of existing 
biodiversity, a market-based ‘management’ of biodiversity, and the possibility of ‘trading’ 
different biodiversities (Tregidga, 2013). In doing so, biodiversity offsets contribute to 
managing the relationship between biodiversity conservation and land development (Ferreira, 
2014), by permitting developments which sacrifice nature of one area in return for 
(theoretically) commensurate conservation values elsewhere (Williams, 2012). 
However, despite the promises of the approach, biodiversity offsetting has proved to be a 
controversial topic. Research into the outcomes of offsetting has produced mixed results, with 
conservation biologists disagreeing on whether offsets can help conserve nature, or contribute 
to losses (Pawliczek and Sullivan, 2011). Some of the weaknesses of the approach include a 
narrow definition of biodiversity; the fact that the concepts underpinning offsetting are based 
on an immature, imprecise and complex science; likely problems with management of offset 
areas and compliance monitoring; and overall lack of resources for implementation (Bull et al., 
2013; Burgin, 2008; Quétier and Lavorel, 2011). As a result, the domain in which biodiversity 
offsets can deliver on the promise of no net loss of biodiversity remains small (Maron et al., 
2012). Furthermore, an examination of individual corporations’ no net loss claims has revealed 
that most have advanced little beyond defining the concept, offering no specifics in terms of 
implementation strategies or expected outcomes (Rainey et al., 2015). In addition, it has been 
that noted biodiversity offsetting would require the creation and development of institutions 
dedicated to managing it (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011; Wissel and Wätzold, 2010). Combined, 
these issues suggest achieving no net loss of biodiversity through offsetting is both 
’administratively improbable and technically unrealistic’ (Walker et al., 2009: 149). Based on 
these limitations, some authors have concluded that the creation of markets for biodiversity 
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offsets consists only of a neoliberal political project, the motivation for which is not to promote 
conservation (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2015a, 2015b; Pawliczek and Sullivan, 2011). But 
despite these criticisms, there is continuing interest in the potential of markets for biodiversity 
offsets. 
In 2010 the UK government announced the creation of 6 ‘pilot’ biodiversity offsetting areas, 
designed to study the potential of offsets in Britain (DEFRA, 2011b; Lawton et al., 2010). The 
scheme was supported by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
and endorsed by the government-sponsored Ecosystems Markets Task Force (EMTF, 2013). 
Six local authorities agreed to host the pilot projects and implement them, reporting to DEFRA 
about findings and best-practice (DEFRA, 2012c), and a number of consultancies became 
involved in advising the processes and implementing the measurements and calculations 
necessary (Caldecott and Dickie, 2011; eftec and IEEP, 2010; Treweek et al., 2009). In 
addition, a private company (Environment Bank) was created to ‘…apply a system of 
biodiversity accounting to the impacts of development and generate investment in wildlife 
conservation via ‘habitat banking’ and biodiversity compensation schemes, such as offsetting.’ 
(Environment Bank, 2013c). The pilots started in 2012, and were completed in 2014. However, 
despite initial interest, as of early 2017 no more attempts had been made to roll out markets 
for biodiversity offsetting in the UK. DEFRA has shown no interest in pursuing the initiative 
(DEFRA, 2014), and the idea appeared to drop off the political agenda.  
The apparent failure of the market for biodiversity offsets to take hold in the UK context 
provides a challenge to some of the prevalent academic analyses of marketisation as a form 
of governance. On the one hand, it confounds the belief that neoliberal governance by the 
market can simply be pushed by a coalition of capital and government (Castree, 2008). 
Despite the coming together of these interests in the promotion of the offsetting pilots, they 
did not result in reproducible markets. On the other hand, the results also belie the 
performativity thesis, that markets exist as a reflection of the models and findings of economics 
(Callon, 1998b). By analysing how and why the attempts to create a market for biodiversity 
offsets in the UK failed, this paper contributes to the understanding of how experiments in 
creating markets as governance mechanisms can be unsuccessful. The paper makes two 
claims: First, that the reasons for failure lie with the difficulty of establishing assemblages – of 
politics, knowledge and actual existing biodiversity – which would have provided a stable and 
reproducible market infrastructure. Second, that despite these difficulties – and the eventual 
demise of biodiversity offsets in the UK – the different components of the assemblages have 
lived on beyond the attempt to create a market, and have the potential to interact with the 
existing governance regime to reconfigure in novel, yet-unseen assemblages. At the centre of 
these debates is accounting for biodiversity: It is a fundamental component of the socio-
technical assemblages upon which governance mechanisms depend to operate, but it 
remains dependent on the politics of the market and on the physical reality it purports to 
account for. 
The paper is organised as follows. First, the importance of politics and knowledge in the 
creation of markets is presented, discussing how calculation is a fundamental aspect of 
markets as governance mechanisms. Following this, the role and applications of accounting 
for environmental problems is discussed and critiqued. The research approach is then 
discussed, including a detailed overview of the case under analysis. Findings are 
subsequently presented, addressing directly the two stated research contributions: 1) 
analysing the processes by which the market for biodiversity offsets in the UK failed to become 
stable and reproducible; and 2) identifying how this failure has not stopped many of its 
components from meshing with the existing arrangements, leading to hybrid governance 
mechanisms. The article concludes with an integrating discussion, which considers the 
possible roles of environmental accounting in the context of debates over the governance of 
nature. 
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Markets and accounting: Governance, calculation and contestation 
The creation and expansion of markets as governance mechanisms has been characterised 
as a fundamental aspect of the neoliberal project (Birch and Siemiatycki, 2015; Peck, 2012). 
Two aspects appear intrinsic to the neoliberal project (Barnett, 2005; Brenner et al., 2010): 
first, that neoliberalisation is the result of a deliberate collaboration between capital and states. 
Neoliberalisation advances by rolling back existing regulations which go against the interests 
of capital, and rolling out new regulations which promote the process of capital accumulation 
(Castree, 2008; Pawliczek and Sullivan, 2011). Second, that because markets favour the 
interests of capital, the neoliberal project would advance through the marketisation of hitherto-
unmarketed aspects of economic and social life (Castree, 2011; Robertson, 2004, 2006, 
2007). This view suggests that the origin of markets can be found in the political project to use 
them as the key tool for governance practice. Ontologically, this perspective assumes that 
markets can be conceptualised as independent objects, to be created according to the agency 
and objectives of political and economic actors. In contrast, research in the fields of economic 
sociology and social studies of science has suggested an alternative view, which sees markets 
as embedded in economic sciences. Rather than simply describing the economy, economics 
is responsible for imagining it and producing the tools which contribute to its creation, guiding 
agents’ actions in the process (Callon, 1998b, 2007). Markets are, in this view, socio-technical 
constructions, originating from the discourses, data, models and tools produced by the 
discipline of economics (Garcia-Perpet, 2007; MacKenzie, 2007). This thesis of the 
performativity of economics implies that to understand markets requires researching how the 
agents, entities exchanged and rules of exchange are constituted (Breslau, 2013; MacKenzie, 
2009c). Of particular interest is the concept of calculation. 
In a market setting, calculation and agency are two sides of the same coin (Miller, 2008), 
implying that to construct a market requires equipping agents with the tools required to 
calculate. This is achieved by developing metrological regimes – sets of devices, rules and 
mechanisms through which non-market externalities are identified, measured and quantified, 
so they can become a part of agents’ calculations (Callon, 1998a). For a market to emerge, a 
new commodity must be created and established (i.e., given a stable legal status and 
recognised technical properties), and made transferable between economic agents 
(MacKenzie, 2009b). This is achieved by employing calculative devices, whose role it is to 
frame non-market entities into commodities (Callon, 1998a; Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Holm 
and Nielsen, 2007). Accounting is one of the fields of knowledge which donates tools and 
practices to calculative devices; however, these devices are constituted by more than 
technical aspects alone. Calculative devices are better understood as balancing acts of 
calculation and other elements, which bring together scientific and technical knowledge, but 
also legal aspects, business and strategic priorities, political projects and implicit cultural 
preferences, among others. In practice, they are better understood as assemblages for 
intervening over and governing economic life (Miller, 2008), whose role is to align the 
combined knowledge, preferences and objectives of various agents (Miller, 2008; Miller and 
O’Leary, 2007; Van Hoyweghen, 2014). The role of accounting is to serve as a mediator, 
aligning political discourses and models from economics and other sciences into mechanisms 
of governance (Miller and O’Leary, 2007; Vosselman, 2014). 
Governance, and the ‘programmes of government’ which underpin it, involves two aspects: 
First, the object to be governed must be given existence, acknowledged and described as an 
economic object to be governed. This is achieved through discourses of governing, which 
imagine arenas of governance and its constituents. Discourses are, in this case, ‘intellectual 
technologies’, through which economic domains are given existence, and thus made 
amenable to calculation (Miller and Rose, 1990). But the role of discourse goes beyond 
producing knowledge about the object to be governed: Discourses of governing inevitably 
carry conceptions of morals, justice and ethics, as well as a conceptualisation of power and 
where the legitimacy to wield that power lies (Rose and Miller, 1992). So in addition to creating 
the object to be governed, discourse is also responsible for setting out how that object is to be 
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governed, and by whom. The second aspect of the creation of ‘programmes of government’ 
involves the translation of discourses into practice, turning ‘systems of thought’ into ‘systems 
of action’ – in other words, extending the legitimacy to exert power to the minutiae of existence 
(Miller and Rose, 1990).  
However, to create a metrological regime does not serve as assurance that it will successfully 
perform as a governance mechanism. In practice, there are no guarantees that any given 
political projects of governing are acceptable. These reasons for this, and how they might 
apply to the specific case of environmental accounting, are discussed in the next section. 
 
Contesting metrological regimes: Environmental accounting as hot topic 
The process of turning (economic) ideas into (governance) actions is not always 
straightforward. The establishment of metrological regimes has consequences which go 
beyond the operation of the market, or the logics of the sciences which provide the knowledge-
base on which the regime is built. Politics is often a crucial aspect in processes of market 
formation: The construction of markets requires political projects to motivate them, identifying 
problems and promoting the market as a potential solution (Muniesa and Callon, 2007). 
Examples of this have been identified in specific examples of market creation, including the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (MacKenzie, 2009a), or Individual Trading 
Quotas for fisheries in Norway (Holm and Nielsen, 2007). In each of these cases, political 
activity was framed through the use of calculative devices; a metrological regime was created, 
which instituted a set of calculative devices; and, crucially, political disagreements about how 
to govern were hidden under the operation of calculative ‘black boxes’ – what has been 
described as the anti-politics machine (Barry, 2002; Barry and Slater, 2002). However, this 
‘cooling down’ (Callon, 1998a) of politically contested situations is not always successful. 
Calculation is always contestable, especially in situations where the knowledge base and the 
methods of measurement are uncertain. Uncertainty about the principles and knowledge base 
which underpins calculation can result in the various groups of agents in a market failing to 
come to an agreement over the economic facts in that market (Callon, 1998a). Calculation 
becomes, in this context, fraught with disagreement. In these situations, the transition from 
discourses to technologies of governance can become the stage for conflicts and 
disagreements (MacKenzie, 2008; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Vollmer et al., 2009). One area 
where this effect is visible is the field of environmental accounting, and especially accounting 
for biodiversity. 
Policy interest in ecosystems accounting has resulted in a number of high profile attempts to 
create accounting standards to estimate the value of nature. Examples include the UK’s 
Principles of Ecosystems Accounting (DEFRA and ONS, 2014) and the United Nations’ 
System of Environmental-Economic Accounting – Central Framework (UN-Stats, 2012). Two 
aspects emerge from these suggested standards: First, that ecosystems accounting can 
include a number of aspects and methods. The two standards set out broad frameworks for 
valuing and accounting for components of ecosystems which are not normally marketed, 
employing for the purpose a variety of principles and methods. Second, the knowledge base 
undergirding these accounting standards remains uncertain. Both documents constitute 
outputs from ongoing projects, to be updated as progress is made in the field of biology, and 
translated into workable accounting standards. However, despite these uncertainties, the 
interest in the role of accounting in helping counter biodiversity loss remains high: Accounting 
for biodiversity, it has been suggested, ‘…can, by reporting organisations’ impacts on 
biodiversity and their efforts to enhance and protect biodiversity, raise stakeholders’ 
awareness of corporations’ impact on wildlife and the extent to which organisations are 
attempting to mitigate this impact’ (Jones and Solomon, 2013: 670). 
Traditionally, the field of environmental accounting has drawn heavily on the principles of 
neoclassical economics. As a result, the practice of environmental accounting has focused on 
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issues such the appropriate reporting of environmental values and liabilities (see, for example, 
Wambsganss and Sanford, 1996). However, this perspective has been criticised when applied 
to environmental issues. In particular, environmental accounting is often concerned with 
economic efficiency to the detriment of other considerations, including social equity, 
environmental sustainability, and ethics and moral suasion (Milne, 1996a). In terms of social 
equity, the practice of environmental accounting risks creating adverse distributive effects, 
displacing the consequences of environmental degradation from better-off groups in society 
to poorer communities (Gibson, 1996). As a result, there is the risk that it will perpetuate 
inequality, rather than addressing the underlying causes of it (Lehman, 1996; Lohmann, 2009).  
There are also concerns that environmental accounting might increase and perpetuate 
environmental damage. The reason for this lies in the ontology of the relationship between 
nature and the economy it envisages, which sees nature as a set of externalities to be 
managed for economic value. This positionality fails to contextualise the mutual dependences 
between humanity and nature, proposing instead to solve environmental problems via a single 
economic instrument, the market (Gibson, 1996). The result of this is an incomplete 
appreciation of the value of nature, which reflects only the preferences inherent in the capitalist 
system (Lehman, 1996; McAfee, 1999, 2012). This issue is especially noticeable in the case 
of complex environmental dimensions, such as biodiversity. Trading requires simple, 
measurable and interchangeable commodities, which all market agents understand and agree 
on; in contrast, biodiversity consists of complex, difficult-to-measure, and mostly non-
interchangeable resources (TEEB, 2008). As a result, accounting often operates by reducing 
biodiversity to simple components, losing track of the interrelations between the various 
components and the biophysical and social environment in which they live in the process 
(Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Robertson, 2006, 2007). 
The issue of ethics and moral suasion presents another set of challenges to environmental 
accounting, which derive from implicit assumptions about the respective rights of companies 
and society with regards to environmental degradation. The operation of markets for 
environmental protection requires that licenses to degrade the environment be issued to 
companies1. This practice attributes to businesses the right to cause environmental 
degradation up to a given limit. As a result businesses gain the right to pollute, up to a given 
level, appropriating society’s rights to a clean environment in the process. This inverts the 
logic that society has the right to an unspoiled environment, in pursuit of market efficiency 
(Milne, 1996a). Society will not always favour nature over development; in fact, it is entirely 
possible for people to favour (perceived) growth in work and wages to the detriment of the 
natural world (Milne, 1996b). But the use of environmental accounting practices to institute 
markets for environmental commodities assumes that position as standard, and in essence 
contributes to remove society’s right to strike a preferred balance between development and 
conservation. 
Environmental accounting and markets for environmental commodities operate by framing 
nature through political discourses (Ascui and Lovell, 2011); and this political dimension 
makes it inherently unstable and subject to contestation. Commenting specifically on the 
practices of carbon accounting and cost-benefit analysis, Lohmann (2009) suggests that: 
…while both techniques might seem destined to reinforce the political power of 
accounting expertise, each in fact helps engender intractable reactions and 
resistances to itself. Although each technique to a certain extent uses the public’s 
distance from its centres of calculation to ‘black-box’ areas of measurement 
controversy, and thus maintain some public faith in the abstract idea of 
computability, in both cases, the more intimately acquainted people become with 
                                               
1 Examples of these licenses include CO2 and SO2 emissions permits, biodiversity offsets or water 
pollution discharge permits, among others. 
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the relevant accounting practices, the less plausible and more contested they 
become. (2009: 529) 
This suggests an inherent risk that environmental accounting, for all its ‘emancipatory 
potential’, may fail to securely align the various discourses and knowledge into functional 
assemblages. But while the effect of disagreements over calculation is understood, 
comparatively less is known about the effects of disagreement in terms of the discourses of 
governing. This is especially important given the proliferation of situations where each of the 
groups of agents promoting alternative discourses hold a degree of political power, giving 
them the ability to influence the construction of technologies of governing, and ultimately the 
governance regimes themselves. This paper analyses one such case, the creation of pilot 
markets for biodiversity offsets in the UK. 
 
Research Approach 
The empirical materials for this paper are drawn from a single case study (Yin, 2009), of an 
existing economic experiment in the creation of a biodiversity offsets market, the Biodiversity 
Offset Pilots scheme in England. The case study approach was selected for two reasons: first, 
it provided a broader, contextual analysis of the phenomena explored. Case study research 
allows complex phenomena to be analysed with reference to the socio-political and economic 
context within which they take place, understanding how and why social phenomena take 
place (Yin, 2009). The analysis followed what Sayer (2000) described as an intensive research 
approach: Focusing on how causal processes work in a limited number of cases, and 
understanding the action of individual agents within those causal contexts. Second, the case 
study approach allowed for the use of multiple sources of evidence to converge the data and 
corroborate findings, in a process of methodological and data triangulation (Stake, 1978, 2000; 
Yin, 2009). 
 
Data sources, data collection and data analysis 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper used both secondary and primary data to 
analyse the emergence of the pilot markets for biodiversity offsets in England.  
In a first phase, publicly-available reports about offsetting from a number of sources, including 
the UK government, consultancies, NGOs and environmental activists were analysed. These 
reports were used to trace the history of the idea of biodiversity offsetting in the UK, from the 
first mentions of the topic until after the end of the programme; to identify important agents 
and groups involved; and to detail the methods used to measure and value biodiversity. 
In a second phase, primary data was collected with the actors identified in the first phase. This 
involved 24 interviews with specialists on biodiversity offsetting worldwide, of which 16 worked 
exclusively in the UK. These included central government bureaucrats, local government 
(planning officers), NGOs, consultants and a senior executive of the only private company 
involved in biodiversity offsets in the UK. The interviews took place during the period in which 
the programme was in operation (2012 to 2014). Interviewees were asked about the rationale 
behind the Biodiversity Offsets pilots, their own involvement with offsetting, and the experience 
of ‘doing biodiversity offsetting’ in practice. Further interview questions focused on the 
methods used to measure and value biodiversity, the challenges and obstacles faced by 
practitioners, and their preferences for future developments in biodiversity offsetting. Each 
interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. All but one were recorded and transcribed, as 
were the participant observation notes collected during the workshops. Additional primary data 
was also collected through participant observation in workshops and meetings in the area of 
biodiversity and business and environmental valuation. This was done for reasons of data 
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triangulation (Yin, 2009), and allowed for the collection of further information about practices 
of ecosystems accounting and environmental valuation. It also provided access to the views 
of large multinational corporations which, while not directly involved in the biodiversity 
offsetting pilots, were frequently quoted by practitioners as potential future buyers. The data 
was coded in order to simplify and aggregate the amount of information gathered, following 
the methodology suggested by the Grounded Theory literature (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
This involved an iterative process of reducing the data collected to a series of codes, grouping 
those codes under major themes, and establishing the relationships between those themes 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Grams, 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Using this grounded theory-
derived methodology, the data analysis process produced a number of dimensions of the 
discourses and representations about biodiversity and markets.  
 
Research Context 
The case study selected was the creation of a pilot biodiversity offsetting programme in the 
UK. This programme is not unique, and exists in the context of similar initiatives worldwide 
(Ecosystem Marketplace, 2014; Ferreira, 2014; Madsen et al., 2010). As of 2017, the main 
source of publicly available information on environmental markets (the Ecosystems 
Marketplace website) listed 59 different biodiversity offsetting programmes, operating in 23 
countries (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2014). The programmes vary in terms of structure and 
forms of operation (Madsen et al., 2011), but share two important aspects: The requirement 
to compensate for biodiversity losses due to development; and the expectation that said 
compensation results in no net loss of biodiversity (BBOP, 2012b; Madsen et al., 2010, 2011). 
In practice this means that, for each case, biodiversity must be measured and quantified, and 
that the value of biodiversity provided as compensation must at least equal the value of 
biodiversity lost to development. This requires the development of mechanisms to measure 
and value biodiversity, so as to demonstrate that no net loss of biodiversity has been achieved 
(BBOP, 2012a). No net loss of biodiversity serves both as a promise of welfare to society and 
as a quasi-technical guidance for the functioning of the market. In terms of its promise, no net 
loss of biodiversity represents a world in which both biodiversity conservation and 
development are allowed to take place, where nature and economic growth co-exist. This 
makes it a desirable option for governments wishing to balance economic growth and nature 
conservation (EMTF, 2013). The guidance aspect of no net loss of biodiversity relates to the 
requirement that equivalence between biodiversity lost and the associated offset is 
demonstrated: No net loss means establishing equivalence between two alternative land uses, 
“a state whereby the expected benefit (credit) generated approximately equals the damage 
(debit)” (eftec and IEEP, 2010: 8). This understanding of equivalence is firmly rooted on a 
metrological regime which can determine benefits and damages; but, crucially, it is also 
steeped in the language of accounting, of translating biodiversity into credits and debits.  
The UK’s Biodiversity Offsets programme started in July 2012 (DEFRA, 2012c) and operated 
for almost two years, until the end of 2014. Six independent pilot areas were selected: Devon; 
Doncaster; Essex; Greater Norwich; Nottinghamshire; and Warwickshire, Coventry and 
Solihull. Initiated and overseen by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), the scheme was designed to test the feasibility of applying biodiversity offsetting in 
the UK context, and to explore the potential for the deployment of the mechanism on a wider 
scale (DEFRA, 2011a, 2012b). A further decision involved identifying, before the start of the 
programme, what aspects of biodiversity would be offset – in other words, what the appropriate 
commodity would be in this market2. In the case of the Biodiversity Offset pilots, a decision 
                                               
2 The complexity of biodiversity, a term which covers aspects of nature from the intracellular to the 
ecosystem level, means that it is virtually impossible to compensate for all biodiversity losses. This has 
led to different programmes worldwide covering different aspects of biodiversity, effectively meaning 
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was made that biodiversity offsets should compensate for all biodiversity lost to development 
(DEFRA, 2012a; eftec and IEEP, 2010). In theory, this meant that all negative impacts 
resulting from development in the pilot areas would be covered by the biodiversity offsetting 
programme. 
Several of the participants in this research remarked that markets for biodiversity offsets 
typically require regulation to compel developers to acquire offsets in order to work as there is 
no ‘natural’ demand for compensation. However, no such regulation was enacted in this 
instance; instead, the regulator insisted that the experimental character of the pilots meant 
regulation was unnecessary. Participating councils were asked to include discussions about 
offsetting in their planning process, and DEFRA offered support and oversight (DEFRA, 
2012b). The concept of requiring developers to provide compensation for damages to 
biodiversity which result from their activities has long been present in the UK’s planning 
regulations. Under Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, developers can 
enter into legally binding planning agreements with planning authorities, in order to provide 
compensation for adverse environmental impacts associated with projects (Latimer and Hill, 
2007). This regulatory context defined that demand for biodiversity offsets would originate in 
developers looking to obtain planning application for their projects.  
Supply of biodiversity offsets, on the other hand, was the subject of further definition by the 
regulator. DEFRA’s guidance materials described ‘biodiversity offset providers’ as any 
individuals or organisations prepared to provide compensation for damages (DEFRA, 2012a). 
This meant that individual landowners were allowed to sell biodiversity offsets – in practice, to 
sign a commitment to preserve a given type of habitat in their land for a fee. Considering how 
fragmented supply and demand were, local authorities were expected to serve as 
intermediaries between developers and landowners. In addition, a private company (The 
Environment Bank) was created with objective of serving as a market intermediary and 
providing legal advice and technical support for offsetting (Environment Bank, 2013c). 
In practice, the pilots operated as very limited markets: There were very small numbers of 
buyers and sellers of biodiversity offsets, which contrasted with the extensive discussions 
which took place between regulators, promoters and potential intermediaries (CEP, 2013). 
The pilots were seen as the first stage for the construction of a new governance regime, 
providing guidance in terms of best practice for future implementations (DEFRA, 2011a). 
 
Research findings 
The failure to build a market: Politics, knowledge, commodity 
The economic experiment in creating a market for biodiversity offsetting in the UK involved 
the alignment of political projects about reforming the governance of nature; the knowledge-
base in terms of measuring and accounting for biodiversity; and the living, existing biodiversity 
itself. The role of each of these, and how they failed to align, is analysed in the sections below. 
The politics of the market: Biodiversity offsets as a governance project 
The existence of a regulatory framework which allowed for developers to agree with local 
authorities to provide compensation for the impacts of their projects (Section 106 of the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1990) would appear to obviate the need for a standalone biodiversity 
offsets scheme in the UK. However, promoters of offsetting highlighted a number of limitations 
in the existing governance regime, framed around two categories of failings: Market failure 
                                               
that specialised measurement and valuation tools must be developed for each individual programme 
(Crowe and ten Kate, 2010). 
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and government failure. In the opinion of a senior executive of a company offering offsetting 
services: 
...we are where we are with regard to biodiversity in this country because we have 
managed to under-sell it and under-value it dramatically. It is the thing that 
underpins everything we do, and yet we put zero value on it, and treat it as a 
luxury. (...) if you over-exploit them, then you won't have natural resources in the 
future to use sustainably. [Interviewee A] 
This assertion that nature is lost because its economic value is not apparent, which is widely 
used in the field of environmental economics (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Hanley et al., 2007), 
cements the idea that the relationship between the modern economy and biodiversity is faulty, 
as the former consistently fails to value the latter. Modern societies, this view suggests, have 
a defective economic compass (TEEB, 2008). This echoes some interpretations of the concept 
of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968, 1994), which argue that lack of property rights 
in nature's goods and services causes underinvestment and excessive extraction, 
compromising long-term sustainability (Smith, 1981). Market failure, according to this view, is 
one of the root causes of biodiversity loss in the UK. 
Neoclassic economic theory suggests that the mechanism to counter market failure is 
government intervention, via regulation (Ostrom, 1990). The existing UK planning regime 
(including the aforementioned Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990) is one 
such attempt, consisting of a piece of legislation which attempts to prevent excessive negative 
impacts over nature. However, this regime has also been presented as failing, not least 
because of a substantial gap between compensation agreed and delivered. This gap is 
attributed to the inadequacy of enforcement of compensation agreements (Latimer and Hill, 
2007). This systemic government failure was described by the senior executive of the 
company offering offsetting services: 
…the developer will sign up to anything prior to getting planning permission. Once 
he's got the planning permission he'll start to try and negotiate: ‘This will be a bit 
too difficult and too costly. I don't think we can do this…’, and local authorities don't 
say ‘Right, stop the development now, or cease your development, or sell your 
site, because you've broken your agreement on mitigation’. They just have to work 
with the developer to work round it, and it ends with nothing being delivered. 
[Interviewee A] 
By characterising the existing governance regime as suffering from both market failure and 
government failure, this set of discourses has produced substantial interest in alternative 
mechanisms to address biodiversity loss. Biodiversity offsetting was among these 
mechanisms, having come to particular prominence in conservation circles since the creation 
of the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) in 2004. What biodiversity 
offsetting offered was nothing short of a radical new way to govern biodiversity. 
Accepting that the previous governance regime was failing and that biodiversity offsets were 
a possible alternative, DEFRA sponsored a number of research and policy papers in the area. 
These included the first scoping study for the development of a biodiversity offsets programme 
in the UK (Treweek et al., 2009) and a review of conservation priorities in England, which 
considered how offsetting could be deployed (Lawton et al., 2010). Following the May 2010 
UK General Election biodiversity offsetting gained political prominence, as the Conservative 
Party, now in coalition government, had pledged in its electoral manifesto to pilot offsetting if 
elected. Under the new government, DEFRA produced a consultation document on offsetting 
(DEFRA, 2010). The results of this consultation eventually led to a new policy document  
(DEFRA, 2011d), where it was confirmed that voluntary, pilot biodiversity programmes would 
be established in England from 2012. After the start of the pilots, and before they could report 
on their findings, DEFRA sponsored the Ecosystem Markets Task Force (EMTF), a business-
led group tasked with identifying the economic growth potential of environmental markets. The 
EMTF identified biodiversity offsetting as their first priority, suggesting that: 
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Designed correctly, a nationwide system of biodiversity offsetting would: save 
developers time and money through reduced risk and uncertainty and a more 
streamlined planning approval process, as well as offering reputational benefits 
and more efficient and valuable net developable areas. (EMTF, 2013: 10) 
This assessment of the business case for biodiversity offsetting highlighted the opportunity to 
change how the relationship between conservation and development was governed, at a 
nationwide scale. Faster, simpler and eventually cheaper planning was identified as a driver 
of economic growth, an important objective to businesses and government alike. In response 
to the EMTF report, DEFRA announced a second consultation paper, in September 2013, on 
the options to introduce biodiversity offsetting in all of England (DEFRA, 2013). Writing to 
Parliament on the occasion of the launch of this second consultation paper, the then-Secretary 
of State for Environment, Food and Rural Owen Paterson, MP, remarked that: 
The best planning decisions do manage to protect and enhance biodiversity; 
however, the system does not always work as well as it should. Some planning 
decisions take too long and the outcome can be too uncertain, which can hinder 
development. At the same time biodiversity impacts are not always adequately 
taken into account, or mitigated or compensated for in ways that deliver enduring 
environmental benefit. 
Biodiversity offsetting has the potential to help the planning system deliver more 
for the environment and the economy. (Paterson, 2013) 
By this stage, just over one year into the pilots, biodiversity offsetting had become a political 
project at central government level. Seen from this prism, offsetting amounted to a concerted 
attempt to change how decisions about conservation and development were taken in England 
– a wholesale change in the governance regime. To achieve this, the pilots needed to 
demonstrate that this new regime was coherent and reproducible, and that the ideas could be 
translated into functioning markets. However, this political project was marred by conflicting 
ideas: Having started out as a market to protect biodiversity, it had since changed into a 
mechanism to deliver economic growth by streamlining planning. The two objectives, while 
compatible in the internal logic of biodiversity offsets (in which more development results in 
more conservation), raised alarm among environmental activists and NGOs, who suspected 
that the government’s intention was to weaken the planning process. During the consultations 
about the creation of a nationwide biodiversity offsets market in England, an alternative idea 
emerged: That biodiversity offsetting would become a license to trash (Carrington, 2013; 
Howarth, 2013; McGrath, 2013; Monbiot, 2012).  
The expression license to trash became an important symbolic qualifier to describe the 
creation of markets for biodiversity offsetting, used to the opposite effect as no net loss of 
biodiversity. The term encompasses aspects such as fears that biodiversity offsets would 
displace damages rather than compensating for them; uncertainty about the possibility that no 
net loss of biodiversity can be achieved in reality; and, perhaps most importantly, about the 
ethical and equity aspects of allowing rich and powerful companies a free hand at destroying 
the common good. A member of a large UK-based NGO explained how their organisation did 
not condone biodiversity offsetting, connecting both environmental and political concerns: 
[Opinions within the NGO] range from quite positive and interested in the idea of 
offsetting, the opportunities it raises, to the highly sceptical, highly cynical, who 
think it's just another way of developers being allowed to get away with damaging 
sites and not really paying the true costs [Interviewee N]  
Through the coalescence of this opposition, the project to reform the governance of nature in 
the UK through a market for biodiversity offsets became politically threatened. By including 
obvious allusions to economic growth and development as one of the objectives of offsets, 
promoters failed to secure the support of other important actors involved in the governance of 
nature. Rather than build a coalition of actors which would support the market, this resulted in 
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the coalescing of an opposition to offsetting. This would eventually reflect in one of the key 
decisions made by the political backers of biodiversity: that the market should compensate for 
all damage to biodiversity. 
 
An uncertain knowledge base: The technologies of a new governance regime 
The political project to use biodiversity offsetting as a mechanism to reform the governance of 
nature, and the UK planning regime with it, is reflected in how the commodity to be traded in 
the market was defined. As noted in the ‘research context’ section, the pilot biodiversity offsets 
were supposed to cover all existing biodiversity and habitats (DEFRA, 2012a). While 
consistent with the UK’s strategic mechanism for directing biodiversity conservation, the 
Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) (Lawton et al., 2010), this choice was a rarity among 
biodiversity offsetting programmes, which generally focus on specific aspects of biodiversity3. 
But because biodiversity offsets were promoted as a mechanism to reform planning, the UK’s 
biodiversity offsets had to be usable in a broad spectrum of contexts. However, this created 
an important challenge: There were no techniques to quantify and commodify biodiversity. 
While it is arguably possible to count or estimate the numbers of individuals of an endangered 
species, the same is not possible to do for all biodiversity. Biodiversity is a complex, composite 
concept, referring to aspects of nature extending from the microcellular to the individual, 
species and ecosystems scales (TEEB, 2008). This complexity makes biodiversity extremely 
difficult to measure, quantify or value (BBOP, 2012a, 2012b; Burgin, 2008; Gomez-Baggethun 
and Perez, 2011). Recognising this basic failure of the knowledge base required to make 
biodiversity calculable, DEFRA opted to issue guidelines for establishing a biodiversity metric: 
Biodiversity in its entirety is impossible to measure so a ‘metric’ is used to 
represent, and provide a measure of, overall biodiversity. Metrics are surrogates, 
or combinations of measurements, that together provide an assessment of the 
biodiversity value of a particular area. The metric allows the biodiversity impact of 
a development to be quantified so that the offset requirement, and the value of the 
compensatory action, can be clearly defined. Metrics are transferable between 
sites and habitats, allowing an impact on one habitat type to be offset with 
conservation action elsewhere, or involving a different habitat type and/or quality 
of habitat. (DEFRA, 2011c: 2) 
The metric is an adaptation of the habitat-hectares method approach, presented in the initial 
scoping study for offsets in the English context commissioned by DEFRA (Treweek et al., 
2009). The method takes into account two dimensions: distinctiveness and condition (DEFRA, 
2011c; Rayment et al., 2011). Biodiversity distinctiveness “...includes parameters such as 
species richness, diversity, rarity (at local, regional, national and international scales) and the 
degree to which a habitat supports species rarely found in other habitats and/or their 
Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) designation” (DEFRA, 2011c: 4). An area suffering impacts 
which result in biodiversity losses would first be scored along bands of distinctiveness – 6 
points to a High distinctiveness area, 4 to a Medium distinctiveness and 2 in the case of Low 
distinctiveness. Following this, the same area would be scored for biodiversity condition, in a 
scale from ranging from Optimum (4 points), Good (3), Moderate (2) to Poor (1). To complete 
the calculation, the scores for distinctiveness and condition were multiplied, producing a score 
– a single index – of biodiversity units per hectare. This was the key indicator of the biodiversity 
value affected by the development project. Calculation was entirely dependent on this single 
index, which was predicted to underpin all agents’ calculations. To complete the calculation, 
the score would then be multiplied by the area (number of hectares) affected, and a set of 
                                               
3 For example, the two most prolific market-based biodiversity offsets programmes in operation, in the 
United States and in Australia, focus on compensation to losses of endangered species (Bonnie and 
Wilcove, 2008; Crowe and ten Kate, 2010; Treweek et al., 2009; Wotherspoon and Burgin, 2009). 
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safeguards applied4. An offset was said to result in no net loss of biodiversity whenever its 
total score is at least equal to the total score for the site impacted. 
DEFRA’s metric was an attempt at producing a calculative device which could be used in the 
context of a national biodiversity offsetting programme. The role of the metric was to reduce 
the complexity of biodiversity to a unit which allowed comparability between two distinctive 
biodiversities (the impact area and the offset area). This was achieved by producing a single 
figure, a common governance mechanism, which assured comparability and governability 
(Miller, 2008). The complexity of the task at hand involved aligning the calculating practices of 
various fields of knowledge (including biology, environmental management and accounting). 
However, a number of issues are immediately apparent: First, the decision to score 
biodiversity in terms of distinctiveness demonstrates the extent to which calculative device is 
dependent on existing political and institutional aspects, such as the English BAP, rather than 
aspects of ecological equivalence alone. This illustrates how biodiversity was being framed by 
a calculative device whose work is, itself, framed by existing political aspects. Second, the 
inexistence of a standardised mechanism to score sites for condition signalled the potential 
for contestation in terms of the calculative mechanisms in practice. In fact, this aspect of the 
device raised its own problems, including the inexistence of a standard habitat condition 
assessment tool (Rayment et al., 2011). This again confirmed that the necessary knowledge 
base for the calculation was at best uncertain, and at worst non-existent.  
In practice, the metrological regime was seen as ineffective and incapable of delivering on the 
main promise of biodiversity offsets, no net loss of biodiversity. This contributed to fuelling the 
critics, who saw biodiversity offsets only as a license to trash nature. The inability to present 
a consistent and trustworthy metrological regime contributed to biodiversity offsets becoming 
a ‘hot topic’, which struggled to be cooled down (Callon, 1998a). Overall, the political project 
of creating a market for biodiversity offsets was fundamentally at odds with the knowledge 
base on biodiversity quantification and commodification: The former demanded that the 
definition of the commodity was expanded, while the latter necessitated that less was included 
in order to work. In addition to these, a third dimension would prove to be at odds with 
offsetting: Biodiversity itself. 
 
Biodiversity: Commodity and power 
Making nature calculable is complicated by the fact that biodiversity is strongly dependent on 
its specific geographical location. Most animal and plant species depend on a given habitat 
for their survival, so much so that the very definition of biodiversity includes mentions of the 
relationships between an individual of a species and the environment they inhabit. The result 
of this geographical dependence is that, when framed into a commodity biodiversity does not 
easily ‘travel’; its fungibility and exchangeability are circumscribed to a specific location. 
Biodiversity offsetting promoters and regulators recognise this fact, and most such 
programmes worldwide recognise that the distance between the area of impact and the offset 
area must be limited (Doswald et al., 2012). In the case of the UK biodiversity pilots, the 
difficulty in creating a fungible commodity from biodiversity was addressed by clearly 
circumscribing the areas where the pilots took place. This local embedding meant that a 
biodiversity offset was only a valid commodity within the pilot areas, and lost its commodity 
status outside of them. Biodiversity limited the space where exchange could take place. Rather 
than one market for biodiversity offsets in the UK, there were a number of independent small 
markets, operating at a very localised scale. 
                                               
4 Safeguards included provisions to assure that the score of the offset area of the offset must never be 
inferior to the area of the area impacted, and that multipliers were employed to account for the risk of 
success in the delivery, risk associated with the area where the offset would be built, and the projected 
time the offset site would take to reach the same condition as the impacted site. 
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The geographical constraints imposed by biodiversity on the market had a second 
consequence: They shifted power from central government to local government. As described 
above, the biodiversity offset pilots operated within the confines of the existing planning 
arrangements, where it falls to local authorities to decide between conservation or 
development proposals. This made local planners, who traditionally were at the very core of 
the existing governance regime, the agents responsible for implementing biodiversity 
offsetting on the ground. However, these planners did not necessary buy into the principles of 
biodiversity offsetting. Interviews with planners in three of the six pilots revealed that all had 
misgivings about the potential consequences of extending the use of biodiversity offsets. As 
a planner in one of the pilot offsetting areas explained, in a typical quote: 
Some people have seen offsetting as almost a license to trash: A developer can 
damage that, pay a sum of money and wash their hands with the situation. 
[Interviewee U] 
The fact that a planner readily invoked the terminology of opponents of offsetting shows how 
they were aware of the political debates around the practice. But it was the uncertain 
knowledge-base in making biodiversity calculable which handed planners significant power to 
shape how the market would eventually operate. Despite the efforts of promoters and 
regulator, no standardised measures of distinctiveness or of habitat condition were available 
for the pilots. At the same time, the pilots had an experimental character: DEFRA and Natural 
England set out to collect evidence of the diversity of mechanisms which could be employed 
to make biodiversity calculable. This meant giving local planners a degree of freedom to 
experiment with changing the metric, in order to try to devise ‘best practice’ in the context. The 
degree of local influence over offsetting is also apparent in DEFRA’s instructions to 
practitioners, which specify that “...offsets should be targeted geographically, and towards 
which conservation priorities, should be taken at the local level as far as possible. In line with 
this principle, local authorities in pilot areas, working with their partners, could decide to add 
conditions to the metric to reflect their particular circumstances and priorities.” (DEFRA, 2011c: 
5). As a result, planners were allowed to adapt and override the DEFRA metric, as explained 
by a planning officer in one of the pilot areas: 
At the end of the pilot they want a really good range of methods used and tried 
over the six pilot areas, and from that they are looking at developing a potentially 
national project. [Interviewee U] 
The development of local adaptations to the calculative devices became common practice, as 
confirmed by planners and environmental managers in the six pilots. One particular adaptation 
involved provisions to include the distance between impact and offset area in the calculation 
mechanism, thus assuring that specific local natural park benefitted from potential payments. 
In another case, the changes went as far as shifting the focus of the calculation from 
ecosystems to species; this implied that impacts over a specific locally-occurring species could 
only be offset locally, due to its rarity elsewhere. Implicit in these changes was the assumption 
that the resulting set of calculative devices was for local use, and reflected a local 
understanding of what was better for local biodiversity. The reasons for the changes were not 
related to improving the metric, but about the maintenance of control over the governance of 
nature. In fact, one of the planning officers highlighted that maintaining local control over where 
offsetting for local damages takes place was the paramount objective of local constituents: 
[Biodiversity offsetting] has got to be within the district, definitely (...). We did a 
calculation on our carbon emissions, and how many trees would need to be 
planted to offset that. They were talking about planting trees in different part of the 
country, and I said “well, our members would not sign up to something that didn't 
see value improvements in this area”. We are very localised, parochial on those 
things. That's elected members, probably wouldn't accept it further afield that the 
district itself. [Interviewee O] 
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The reference to carbon offsetting is indicative of the political reasons to oppose biodiversity 
offsetting. The market for carbon offsets has benefitted from the creation and acceptance of a 
unit which compares emissions in one location to emissions elsewhere (CO2e). This has made 
calculation and the estimation of equivalence possible, making carbon emissions equivalent 
in different locations, and allowing exchange to take place across space (MacKenzie, 2009b) 
– the unit has made carbon dioxide (apparently) fungible. By expressing reservations about 
the acceptance of offsetting carbon emissions away from the district, the interviewee rejected 
both fungibility of biodiversity, and letting go of responsibility for decision-making. At a second 
pilot biodiversity offset council, another planning officer expressed similar views: 
Our steering group is very keen that the offset provision is done within the [local 
authority] area, smaller than the county. They want it to try to be as close to the 
development as they can. The approach we are taking is to tie it in as locally as 
possible. (…) One of the reason for that is local people are often concerned about 
the wildlife in their area, and if they see an area they know is quite good for wildlife 
being lost, it is important they also see the local benefits of the offsets. I think tying 
it geographically to where the damage is being done is crucial that will be needed 
to take local people and communities to support the project. [Interviewee U] 
Biodiversity proved to be what Karen Bakker has described as an uncooperative commodity: 
an entity whose biophysical, spatial and sociocultural characteristics make it resistant to 
commodification (Bakker, 2003, 2005). The Actor Network Theory-derived work of Callon and 
colleagues (Callon, 1998c, 1999) helps describe and understand the agency of biodiversity 
itself: Its properties and actions are unruly elements, which cause the economic objects and 
models to become entangled with actually existing nature. It is not just that biodiversity is not 
easily measured and quantified, or that the knowledge-base to do so remains uncertain; 
rather, biodiversity becomes a political actant in its own governance, resisting being moved 
for the sake of the functioning of the market. In doing do, nature presides over a crucial power 
shift, from the promoters of the market approach to governing biodiversity to local planners, 
whose stated preference is for a more nuanced, locally embedded form of governance of 
nature. 
 
A hybrid new governance regime? 
The case of the biodiversity offsets pilot in England illustrates how, even in an economic 
experiment starting from first principles, the development of a metrological and calculative 
regime did not succeed in eliminating political resistance. The ‘anti-politics machine’ – 
deploying technical knowledge to subsume political disagreement (Barry, 2002) – proved 
ineffective in cooling down the situation, resulting in continuing political disagreement about 
how a new governance regime built around biodiversity offsets could take root. By the end of 
the running of the pilots, the new governance regime based around offsetting seemed to have 
failed to take root. In the aftermath of the process, the government made no attempts to draft 
regulation requiring offsetting in all of the UK. Whatever indirect indications have emerged 
suggest that the political momentum behind the idea of biodiversity offsetting has all but 
disappeared. For example, in their response to an EU consultation on the potential application 
of the concept of no net loss across Europe, DEFRA manifested reservations about the 
potential of biodiversity offsetting: 
There are also a number of detailed rules which would need to be settled before 
any offsetting system could be put in place and on which we suspect there is little 
consensus at present. For example: Who would operate the metric and how would 
consistency be ensured; how much trading up or down would be allowed; would 
there be restrictions on where an offset could be located; how would we ensure 
that offsets do not have unintended downsides (DEFRA, 2014: 2) 
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The reservations revolve around the lack of consensus around what constitutes an appropriate 
calculation mechanism to demonstrate no net loss of biodiversity (DEFRA, 2014). Due to lack 
of consensus around calculation, it has not been possible to successfully transform 
representations into standardised calculative devices, and thus create a new governance 
regime. 
DEFRA was not the only agent attempting to develop calculative devices for the pilot 
biodiversity offsets market. One private company was involved in the pilot biodiversity offsets 
programme from its inception, with the objective of becoming an intermediary in this market, 
as explained by one of the company’s senior executives: 
…we would like to see ourselves as the Google of the providers of these sites, or 
access to them. I just think that would be fantastic, if we could create a business 
around this [biodiversity offsets], and build [the company] into the organisation that 
provides all the trading infrastructure for this [Interviewee A] 
The objective of this company was, as clearly stated, to establish itself as the de-facto broker 
for this market, but intermediating between buyers and sellers. Among the mechanisms the 
company pioneered in order to achieve this was the development of its own set of technologies 
and metrics, referred to by the interviewee as ‘the trading infrastructure’. The company went 
about developing this by, first, adapting calculation procedures from the DEFRA metric, and, 
second, combining these with a suite of proprietary technologies which were designed as a 
calculative network. As explained by the same executive: 
...what interests us is to convert that into a fully functioning market (…) we want 
the environmental consultancy community, or land audits, to be able to use a 
software application, which will enable them to calculate the conservation credits 
– or eco-credits – that a development or a land-use impact is having, and then it 
can automatically be uploaded to the trading platform, and then we can match it 
with what credits are required. [Interviewee A] 
In developing these technologies during the pilots, the company set about creating an 
alternative form of making biodiversity calculable, similar in principle and execution to 
DEFRA’s metric. Furthermore, these calculative devices were, in theory, capable of avoiding 
the entanglements between existing biodiversity and the politics of reforming planning: Rather 
than being involved in the adaptations implemented by local planners, the company sought to 
provide a complete service, estimating the credits biodiversity credits necessary to 
compensate for a developer’s project, and suggesting locations where those credits could be 
acquired from. As of the second half of 2016, the company remained in operation, maintaining 
a registry of land which could be used to offset biodiversity losses elsewhere (Environment 
Bank, 2013b), and continuing to offer landowners the possibility of calculating the biodiversity 
credits their site might generate (Environment Bank, 2013a).  
There is also evidence that, while biodiversity offsets appeared to have disappeared from 
public discussions about biodiversity governance, no net loss of biodiversity continues to be a 
valid policy concept. During the data collection for this research, not a single interviewee 
disagreed with the idea; all the objections raised were related to the specific details involved 
in translating the principle of no net loss of biodiversity into market practice. Furthermore, the 
idea of no net loss of continues to be invoked in practice: For example, National Rail built the 
environmental objectives for the upcoming HS2 railway around the objective of delivering no 
net loss of biodiversity (BBC News, 2015; Parliament UK, 2014), demonstrating the power of 
the idea as a driver for action. Likewise, local authorities looking to secure compensation in 
exchange for granting planning permission continue to be allowed to use the biodiversity 
metric to do so (Environment Bank, 2015). A hybrid governance regime, which protects the 
role of local authorities as the preeminent agents in deciding between conservation or 
development, but operate under the principles and calculative devices of offsetting, appears 
to be taking hold. While this is not the fully-fledged market for biodiversity offsets envisaged 
by promoters before the start of the pilots, the basic principles and market devices of offsetting 
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are recombining with the existing governance arrangements to produce a hybrid governance 
regime. 
 
Concluding comments 
The project to implement biodiversity offsetting in the UK sought nothing less than to 
fundamentally reorganise the relationship between the environment, the economy and society. 
In particular, it attempted to subordinate the governance of biodiversity to the economic 
imperative of efficiency, streamlining planning and helping deliver economic growth. In the 
event, the political project of market creation failed to account for the resistance posed by 
biodiversity itself: As an externality, the living, moving biodiversity proved resistant to attempts 
to commodify it. The most sophisticated standards of ecosystems accounting could only 
measure and quantify biodiversity, but failed to separate it from the restricted contexts of space 
and time which it depended on. These contexts are not only bio-physical – the irreplaceable 
habitats highlighted by critics of offsetting (Bull et al., 2013; Burgin, 2008; Devictor, 2015; 
Gordon et al., 2011); they refer also to the (local) political and cultural aspects which constitute 
important dimensions of biodiversity. The calculative devices developed proved incapable of 
accounting for those dimensions: They could calculate (some of) the biological components 
of a given ecosystem, but could not abstract or valuate the social, cultural and political 
dimensions of that ecosystem. Due to its complexity, biodiversity consistently resisted 
attempts to frame it as a commodity. 
Another aspect which contributed to the failure to institute a reproducible market for 
biodiversity offsets in the UK was the uncertain knowledge base underpinning ecosystems 
accounting. Because there were no readily available ecosystems accounting standards 
available to policymakers, the choice was made to give local planners the opportunity to 
change and develop the DEFRA metric. This had an impact in terms of agency and the 
distribution of power among the agents involved, with local policymakers gaining the ability to 
change the metric to reflect local priorities and preferences, without reference to the wider 
market. As it became apparent that applying ecosystems accounting to the problem of 
conservation raised the prospect that damages to nature could be simply redistributed, making 
local communities worse off (Gibson, 1996; Milne, 1996a), local policymakers created 
alternative calculative devices, which preserved local biodiversity. Rather than hiding the 
possible consequences in a calculative ‘black box’, ecosystems accounting exposed the 
problem to local planners and environmental activists. Local policymakers used this 
information to avoid the ‘license to trash’ scenario. 
 
Overall, the various aspects of market creation failed to mesh felicitously (Hébert, 2014) with 
the existing governance regime, as well as with each other in the economic experiment with 
biodiversity offsets in the UK. In their entanglements with the planning system they sought to 
reform and substitute, the politics, knowledge and materiality of biodiversity offsets 
consistently failed to gain traction. But just as importantly, the various aspects of the market 
project proved to be incompatible with each other: The politics demanded knowledge which 
did not exist in order to achieve its objectives, thus becoming irreversibly compromised; and 
the knowledge base and political project were at odds with biodiversity itself. Failure to align 
these various components into a functional assemblage impeded the development of an 
accepted metrological regime. However, this failure to perform economics should not be 
dismissed as the result of some vague historical, contextual or cultural aspects. Quite the 
opposite: The existing ecosystems accounting standards were not fit-for-purpose when tasked 
with disentangling biodiversity-as-a-commodity from physical, living nature. The ideal world of 
economic models and discourses could not hide the complexity of the material reality it 
purported to represent. 
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This does not mean that failure to institute a market signals the end of the project. The 
successful implementation of governance projects is dependent on the capacity of promoters 
to successfully bring together supporters and opponents of the market. These situations tend 
to happen in contexts where power – political as well as technical – is held by one side of the 
debate. But the case analysed in this paper shows a different situation, in which opposing 
camps all support marketisation, only disagreeing about the specifics of how it should be 
implemented. Because of their shared commitment to offsetting, all the groups involved hold 
the power and legitimacy to steer the debate in their preferred direction. In effect, because of 
the shared power and agency over the design of biodiversity offsetting, local planners were 
effectively capable of changing it to how it was implemented in practice. But conversely, this 
also means that the discourses and tools which were developed for the purposes of rolling out 
the market have a residual, continuing potential. There may be not market for biodiversity 
offsets in operation in the UK, and few prospects of developing one, but the principle of 
calculating impacts and securing compensation which results in no net loss of biodiversity 
according to those calculations has not disappeared. Planning in the UK is – slowly, out of the 
limelight of political debate – being reformed to include these principles. The impacts will, 
likely, be long-lasting.  
The findings of this research suggest a number of avenues for future research. As markets 
continue to be promoted and deployed as governance mechanisms for economic life, equal 
attention should be paid to the reasons why they fail to take root. As argued in this paper, 
neither the neoliberalisation nor the performativity of economics theses present a satisfactory 
theory which might explain why marketisation succeeds in some situations and not in others. 
The answer does not appear to lie only in contestation about calculation (e.g. Callon, 1998) or 
in political opposition to markets (e.g. Prudham, 2004); a more deliberate focus on the 
assemblages of knowledge, political power and materiality – how they come together 
felicitously or not, and why – suggests a promising avenue for understanding how markets 
sometimes fail to become instituted. Likewise, the findings suggest that parts of a failed market 
assemblage have the capacity to continue to influence economic processes even after being 
dismissed as unsuitable or undesirable for governance. To understand the recombinant nature 
of assemblages – how ideas, devices, people and non-human entities – can circulate and 
impact the world is likewise a promising avenue for research. To address these issues seems 
likely to contribute to the understanding of marketisation and governance, as well as 
processes of economic transformation in general. 
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